Overthrowing Fate: Barbarossa Revisted

Treść źródłowa

It is probably not a good sign when an article has to begin with an editorial note that breaks the fourth wall, but here we are. I have analyses of the frontline in Ukraine and a new entry in our naval history series currently in the works, but I’ve been derailed by a challenge that emerged from Twitter (I refuse to call it X) which I’ve been unable to shake out of my mind. People were arguing, as they seem to endlessly do, over what Germany could have done to win World War Two. This is a sort of evergreen topic that is easy bait for engagement, but I had an irresistible urge to give it a treatment of my own. My motivation, as such, is largely the persistent myth that Germany lost the war when it delayed its offensive to capture Moscow in 1941. This is a grossly misunderstood topic, which assumes unrealistic German freedom of action at the critical moments in August and September 1941. In fact, Germany had no possibility of moving on Moscow earlier than it did. Furthermore, the obsession with Moscow obfuscates the real crisis facing the Wehrmacht, which was the attrition of its most important units, a shortage of replacement personnel, and fuel shortages. So, rather than falling back on the popular motif that the war was decided at the gates of Moscow, we will look more holistically at the crisis of the Wehrmacht and plot a better course. Subscribe nowTo keep such analysis grounded in some sense of realism, we will try to speculate about German decision making within their historical constraints, particularly as it relates to manpower, logistical lift, and military intellig…